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Abstract
This article aims to bring  to  the  fore  some  of  the  underlying  rationales  that  inform  common
conceptions of  the  constitution  of  risk  communication  in  academic  and  policy  communities.
‘Normative’, ‘instrumental’ and ‘substantive’ imperatives typically employed in the  utilisation  of
risk communication are first outlined.  In  light  of  these  considerations  a  theoretical  scheme  is
subsequently devised leading to the articulation of  four  fundamental  ‘idealised’  models  of  risk
communication termed the ‘risk message’ model, the ‘risk dialogue’ model, the ‘risk field’  model
and  the  ‘risk  government’  model  respectively.  It  is  contended  that   the   diverse   conceptual
foundations  underlying  the  orientation  of  each  model  suggest  a   further   need   for   a   more
contextualised view  of  risk  communication  that  takes  account  not  only  of  the  strengths  and
limitations of different formulations and functions of risk communication, but also the  underlying
knowledge/power  dynamics  that  underlie  its  constitution.  In  particular  it  is  hoped   that   the
reflexive  theoretical  understanding  presented  here  will   help   to   bring   some   much   needed
conceptual  clarity  to  academic  and   policy   discourses   about   the   use   and   utility   of   risk
communication in advanced liberal societies.
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1. Introduction
Risk communication has become increasingly prevalent as an area of academic research, with  one
recent review accounting for 349 risk communication articles published within the  environmental
and technological risk fields alone between 1988 and  2000  (Gurabardhi  et  al  2004;  Gurabardhi
2005). A literature search recently conducted on behalf of the UK Government Inter-Departmental
Liason Group on Risk Assessment (ILGRA 2002) claimed  to  have  revealed  over  1000  English
language publications on risk communication in the 10 years prior to the review, providing further
indication that the risk communication field is clearly  a  vast  and   rapidly  growing  area.  Whilst
some academics have attempted  to  trace  some  qualitative  aspects  of  the  development  of  risk
communication over the past thirty years  or  so  pointing  to  how  best  practice  has  evolved  for
example  (for  useful  reviews  see:  Fischhoff  1995;  Gurabardhi  et  al  2004;  Gurabardhi   2005;
Krimpsky date; Leiss 1996; Lofstedt  2005;  National  Research  Council  1989;  McComas  2006;
Palenchar  and  Heath   2007),   others   have   also   noted   the   systematic   embedding   of   risk
communication in regulation and corporate governance (see for  example:  Gouldson  et  al.  2007;
Hood et al. 2001; Lofstedt 2005; Power 2004; Rothstein et al. 2006).  The  quantitative  expansion
of  formalised  interest  in  risk  communication  is   particularly   made   apparent   by   the   broad
distribution of national and international agencies that have increasingly documented and  advised
on the requirement for risk communication, as well as its role within their own  organisations  and
for others (see for example:  European  Food  Safety  Authority  2006;  ILGRA  2002;  ISO  2002;
OECD 2002; UK Government Cabinet Office Strategy Unit 2002; US National Research  Council
1989;   World   Health   Organisation   2002).   However,   despite   the   apparent   evolution   and
popularisation of formal approaches to risk communication opinion can be said to be divided over
its purpose and suitability. On the one hand it  would  seem  that  many  academics,  public  health
practitioners, industry consultants and policymakers amongst others variously find intrinsic appeal
to  the  notion  of  risk  communication  and  see  ever  broadening  possibilities  for   its   potential
application. For example,  an  influential  report  for  the  US  National  Research  Council  (1989)
identified that growth in government  interest  in  risk  communication  has  been  driven  by  such
diverse motivations as the requirement and desire to inform, to overcome opposition to  decisions,
to share power,  and  to  seek  alternatives  to  direct  regulatory  control.  In  turn,  the  day-to-day
provision of risk communication would appear to be seen by many advocates  as  encompassing  a
wide variety of modes and formats, which on the  face  of  it  are  to  a  varying  degree  seemingly
facilitative of meeting these objective concerns.
On the other hand, the application of risk communication has  also  faced  strong  criticism  that  it
may be adopted quite restrictively and as such be easily dismissed as amounting to  no  more  than
simply a form of ‘PR’ or ‘spin’. According to Jasanoff (cited  in  Morgan  and  Lave  1990)  many
officials seem  to  regard  risk  communication  as  a  codeword  for  ‘brainwashing’  for  example.
Nelkin  (2002)  has  likewise   observed   that   risk   communicators   have   frequently   presented
exaggerated claims about the pros of adopting new technology verses  the  negative  consequences
of failing to do so as a strategic ploy to help resolve risk conflicts. Nelkin also further notes that in
such disputes public and stakeholder concerns can often become reduced to technical questions  to
be answered by recourse to ‘better’ science alone; if any residual fears  still  remain  it  is  through
information   conveyed   via   risk   communication   that   a   resolution   is   to   be   found.   Risk
communication has therefore arguably been marked by its utilisation for perpetuating  beliefs  that
new  technologies  are  unequivocally  beneficial  rather  than   for   more   noble   goals   such   as
encouraging the public debate about their possible adoption and use. Pidgeon and  Rogers-Hayden
(2007) have similarly questioned whether traditional forms of risk  communication  have  evolved
sufficiently to accommodate broader social values,  implications  and  visions  for  the  future  that
have been emphasised in recent trends towards ‘upstream engagement’ about new technologies.
In light of these criticisms it does seem reasonable to question how far  the  rhetoric  and  ideas  of
risk  communication  actually  translate  into  socially  valued  communicative  action  or  whether
indeed they were ever intended to do so.  But  furthermore,  even  when  risk  communication  has
been implemented in good faith and according to plan, it seems that the possibility  for  ‘effective’
risk communication is far from certain and that in some instances  it  may  in  fact  do  more  harm
than  good  (Fischhoff  1995;  Lofstedt  2005).  These  reservations  about   the   ‘reality’   of   risk
communication in practice therefore raise fundamental questions about  the  very  purpose  of  risk
communication and how its use and utility might, in principle, be conceived. Yet,  seemingly  few
attempts have been made to try to distil different academic and  policy  conceptualisations  of  risk
communication and to integrate this knowledge in a  coherent  fashion.  One  notable  problem,  as
McComas  (2006)  observes,  is  that  whilst  research  on   risk   communication   is   diverse   and
multidisciplinary in nature, and thus draws from a well-rounded pool of knowledge and  expertise,
the field suffers from few integrative theoretical frameworks which makes it difficult to  centralise
or to capitalise on this knowledge (see also Bostrom  and  Lofstedt  2003;  Lofstedt  and  6  2008).
Indeed,  parsing  the  academic  literatures  across  different  disciplines  it  is   not   always   made
altogether  clear  how  different  theories  and  practices  of  risk  communication   are   connected.
Furthermore,  whether  in  relation  to  science,   health,   politics,   lifestyle,   technology,   or   the
environment, despite being ostensibly united by a shared language, different  communities  with  a
common interest in risk communication typically seem  to  talk  past  one  another,  perhaps  being
divided by their own particular outlooks, understandings and experiences (Horlick-Jones 2008).
All this has perhaps exacerbated the problem that the underlying beliefs commonly concerning the
conceptualisation of risk communication processes and their outcomes are rarely acknowledged or
subjected to proper rigour and scrutiny. Hence, as with much risk communication research, a
growing number of often instructive reviews have instead generally maintained an atheoretical
focus, with reviewers and researchers for the most part intent on highlighting the most important
challenges facing the increasing number of agencies and organisations that suddenly find they
have a risk communication problem. This has in turn led to the prescription of ‘best practice’
solutions to help address those particular risk communication problems. But, as has been similarly
observed of other fields by Richardson (1996), the adoption of such ‘toolbox’ approaches
arguably permits risk communicators, analysts and policymakers to ‘draw from a wide body of
techniques without necessarily being aware that the techniques they adopt bear the imprints of
broader scientific, political, economic or social theory [or that] …they are permeated by
power/knowledge relations’ (p289). Consequently, the prevailing atheoretical understanding of
the application of risk communication lends itself to confusion or the possible imposition of
particular value frames which mask the effects of power and distort risk management and
regulatory policy processes.
Against this critical backdrop the remainder of this article addresses the apparent theoretical
lacuna concerning the constitution of risk communication as advocated and practiced in advanced
liberal societies. I begin by first briefly outlining ‘normative’, ‘instrumental’ and ‘substantive’
imperatives for engaging in risk communication, as reflected for example in calls for greater
public engagement in risk appraisal and decision making more generally (see Fiorino 1990; Stern
and Fineberg 1996; Pidgeon 1998; Pidgeon and Rogers-Hayden 2007; Rowe and Frewer 2000;
Stirling 2005). It is suggested that the practical orientation of risk communication around these
imperatives is connected to more or less implicit assumptions not only of the purpose or function
of risk communication, but also about how that purpose or function will be brought into effect.
However, these assumptions are rarely fully articulated in terms of existing social and
psychological theories of communication. What follows is a critical exposition of how the
constitution of risk communication may be theorised in light of these objective concerns. By
demarcating different interpretations of risk communication within an integrative theoretical
account it is hoped that this will help to bring some conceptual clarity to academic and policy
debates and empirical inquiry concerning common understandings, intentions, impacts and
practices of risk communication.
2. Three imperatives for risk communication[1]
First characterised by Fiorino (1989; 1990), the ‘normative’ imperative for risk communication  as
it  is  adopted  here  stems  from  a   process-based   ethic   which   typically   considers   that   risk
communication  is  undertaken  simply  because  it  is  ‘the  right  thing  to  do’  without  particular
reference to the ends or outcomes to which it may  lead  (see  also  Pidgeon  and  Rodgers-Hayden
2007). This view is guided by the belief that as there is a value dimension to risk, and citizens  are
the best judge and executers  of  their  own  interests,  risk  communication  should  raise  people’s
awareness of risk and enable citizens to be party to individual risk decisions that personally  affect
them and their communities (see Fiorino 1990; Pidgeon and Rogers-Hayden 2007; Stirling  2005).
However, to the extent that risk communication is thought to be a valued end in  and  of  itself  the
normative imperative can actually be seen to be informed by two democratic ideals. The first ideal
centres  on  the  obligation  by  actors,  such  as  individuals,  groups,   business   organisations   or
government  agencies,  in  liberal  democracies  of  Western  politics  to   inform   (Powell   2000).
Operating on this basis risk communication may be orientated towards fulfilling such functions  as
the  ‘public   right-to-know’,   ‘freedom   of   information’,   ‘informed   consent’   or   ‘emergency
preparedness’ through the disclosure of information about the risks of hazards to potential  victims
as  well  as  behavioural  advice  and  guidelines  prior  to  or  during   acute   risk   situations   and
emergencies.  The  second  ideal  entails  the  view  that   citizens   should   be   involved   in   risk
communication allowing equal opportunity for representation and  participation  in  debates  about
how risk is characterised  and  managed  for  example.  Recent  risk  communication  research  has
indicated and largely supported a general  trend  towards  facilitating  stakeholder  involvement  in
deliberative dialogue to help characterise  risk  and  set  risk  management  priorities  and  policies
which represent a cross-section of interests (Klinke and  Renn  2002;  Lofstedt  2005;  Petts  2001;
Stern and Fineberg 1996). From the normative perspective risk  communication  can  therefore  be
seen as fulfilling two valued roles  that  are  thought  to  represent  the  interests  of  the  individual
citizens of a society, but whereas the  first  implies  risk  communication  is  a  process  of  experts
speaking out to the public, the second implies  the  process  of  various  publics  speaking  back  to
experts.
In contrast to the normative imperative, the instrumental imperative construes risk communication
as a resource or means that may be employed by an individual, group or organisation to help them
achieve the particular ends they seek. In this context risk communication has often been conceived
essentially as a corporate survival mechanism that evolved in strategic adaptation  to  the  external
pressures placed on industry following  such  incidents  as  Bhopal  (Chess  2001)  and  Chernobyl
(Wynne 1989; 1992), the BSE or ‘mad cow’ crisis (Leiss 1996) and conflict over the  dumping  of
the Brent Spar oil storage platform in the North Sea (Lofstedt and Renn 1997). The  value  of  risk
communication is therefore understood instrumentally in these respects according to how it  might
support the particular aims of  an  organisation  faced  with  a  potentially  hostile  environment  in
which different actors vie to realise their own interests and ambitions. From this point of  view  an
organisation is often specified as the communicator in a ‘battle for the hearts and minds’ of  target
audiences such as citizens or government in  light  of  counter  claims-making  activities  by  other
stakeholders and the media for example (Gouldson  et  al.  2007).  An  organisation’s  commercial
interests may therefore dictate that risk communication is utilised in a wish to smooth the  path  of
a potentially controversial new product to market by co-opting stakeholders into  decisions,  or  by
assuaging public concerns in  the  face  of  criticism  from  NGOs,  the  media  or  other  interested
parties. For such uses the organisation in question  is  no  doubt  attributed  to  be  the  most  direct
beneficiary  of  risk   communication,   and   it   is   largely   from   within   this   frame   that   risk
communication has been admonished for helping organisations  to  reach  instrumental  objectives
particularly if it is at the expense of others. However, in so much  as  risk  communication  can  be
conceived  as  an  instrumental  resource  it  can  quite  clearly  be  deployed  by  host  of  different
individuals, groups and organisations for a variety of particular ends. The success of organisations
like  Greenpeace  International  in  raising  awareness  and  amplifying  the  controversy  that   has
surrounded  the  disposal  of  Brent  Spa,  global  warming  or  the   commercial   development   of
genetically modified food crops and other  such  campaigns  is  a  testament  to  this  fact  (see  for
example Bakir 2005).
Finally,  the  substantive  imperative  advocates  that  risk  communication  should  be  utilised   to
generate improvements in understanding and the  quality  of  knowledge  available  when  making
risk related decisions. Proponents of this  position  contend  that  it  may  be  possible  to  generate
better decision outcomes by generating insights from a variety of sources with different  points  of
view that might not otherwise have been accounted for via a purely technocratic or  individualistic
approach (e.g. Wynne 1989).  The substantive argument therefore  often  goes  hand-in-hand  with
the deliberative ideals identified above and reflects a concern that risk communication may play  a
crucial role in attempting to close critical gaps between what is known by different actors  about  a
particular risk in question and what needs to be known. The  substantive  argument  may  however
also become aligned with instrumental concerns, but in contrast  to  purely  instrumental  concerns
the substantive imperative for risk communication is conventionally portrayed as motivated by the
wish to achieve outcomes that favour the general  interest  rather  than  self-serving  ends  (Stirling
2005). One stated goal of  organisational  risk  communication  preferred  by  some  academics  in
these respects is to  help  people  in  society  to  make  health  risk  choices  wisely  either  through
education or the advocacy of certain behaviours in citizens (Bostrom 2003). This may occur when
trying to help people put new risk information into perspective both for themselves and for  others
so as to improve their understanding and the quality of risk decisions for example (see Ropeik and
Slovic 2006).
The nuances of the substantive position also come sharply into focus  in  view  of  the  use  of  risk
communication for the resolution of risk conflicts. For example, Fischhoff  (1995)  has  advocated
that one objective of organisational risk communication is to facilitate a  focus  within  society  on
‘fewer, but better’ risk conflicts that include the consideration of both social  concerns  as  well  as
scientific principles (see also Renn 1998).  The implication here  is  that  risk  communication  can
serve the general good by providing a  means  not  only  for  parties  to  focus  their  attention  and
resources on what matters most, but also in helping them to figure out what matters most.  From  a
substantive point of view the purpose of risk communication in these respects is the establishment
of understanding, not necessarily  conflict  resolution.  As  Krauss  and  Morsella  (2000)  contend
given a genuine desire to resolve conflict good communication may  help  people  to  achieve  that
aim through facilitating better understanding, but it cannot guarantee that conflict will be resolved
or even ameliorated. Even when people caught up in conflict understand the  situation  at  hand  as
well as the perspectives, intentions and motivations of one another  there  may  still  be  legitimate
fundamental reasons for disagreement. But where as  in  the  words  of  Mahatma  Ghandi  ‘honest
disagreement   is   often   a   good   sign   of    progress’,    poor    communication    can    lead    to
misunderstanding, which may instead increase the likelihood that conflict will  be  exacerbated  or
misplaced (Krauss and Morsella 2000).
3. Theorising risk communication
The normative, instrumental and substantive imperatives outlined above indicate that risk
communication can be conceived as fulfilling a wide variety of objective purposes. However, to
date there has been relatively little discussion of how these imperatives may overlap or come into
conflict with one another, or about the implicit assumptions of communicative action held within
each of these imperatives.  Indeed, what is not fully articulated thus far is a functional
understanding of how communication actually ‘works’ and how this understanding can inform
different conceptualisations of risk communication, its research or its practice. The theoretical
approach that has arguably come closest to achieving such an endeavour is the Social
Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) developed and introduced by Kasperson et al. (1988).
This conceptual framework is generally well noted for providing a general understanding of the
role of risk communication in connecting risk events and their economic, social and psychological
outcomes. However, the idea here is not to develop a unified theory or conceptual framework of
risk communication, but to outline a theoretically driven conceptual scaffold which may in turn
help to inform present understandings of risk communication in different respects. In light of the
different imperatives outlined above, and particularly if, as Horlick-Jones (2008) has recently
argued, responses to risk are not intrinsically instrumentally calculative, but reflect the specificity
of the risk issue in question and of the settings in which it is encountered, it therefore also seems
reasonable to concede that no single generic view of risk communication will suffice. Rather the
conceptualisation of risk communication might perhaps benefit from adopting a similarly
contextualised and differentiated approach.
The theoretical approach presented is thus organised around a conceptual scheme which identifies
four idealised ‘models’ of risk communication (see Figure 1). These models are conceived in light
of the normative, instrumental and substantive imperatives for engaging in risk communication
outlined above and allow for perspectives drawn from contemporary communication theory. The
vertical axis of Figure 1 conveys the implied communicative intent or driver of risk
communication (i.e. normative or instrumental), whereas the horizontal axis characterises the co-
involvement of different agents in the social construction of risk (i.e. how potential participants
are seen to be substantively engaged in constituting communicative action and risk meaning). It is
suggested that the fundamental orientations of these perspectives along these two axes can
therefore be seen to characterise the constitution of risk communication represented by each of the
four associated risk communication ‘models’. These risk communication models are developed
with particular reference to the work of Krauss and Fussel (1996) whom have specified different
perspectives of inter-personal communication within social psychology, as well as the seminal
work of social theorists such as Foucault, Habermas, Bourdieu and Luhmann. As ‘ideal types’
each of the four models depicts risk communication as constituted in a distinct form that may in
principle help to guide communicative action in a particular context, but which will never be fully
realised in practice. Instead, it is contended that these models offer complementary insights into
specific aspects of risk communication theory and practices which serve to illuminate the inherent
strengths and weaknesses of different approaches, and so each should not be considered in
isolation. The conceptual foundations underlying each model are presently discussed in turn.
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Figure 1. Four conceptual models of risk communication.
4. The ‘risk message’ model
Following the normative imperative to inform, the ‘risk message’ model of risk communication as
it is termed here is predicated on the underlying assumption  that  the  environment  in  which  risk
communication takes  place  can  be  compared  to  a  ‘free  market’  system  in  which  goods  are
produced, transported, purchased and consumed. In this environment risk messages  are  subjected
to a ‘market test’ whereby well produced, accessible messages will find their market  niche  if  the
receiver can process them with little disruption or distraction, but poorly produced  risk  messages
will eventually fail (Jaeger et al. 2001). A central concern of the risk  message  model  is  that  risk
communication should accord with a concern for transparency. Transparency has  long  been  held
as a key component to  modern  democracy  and  public  service  reform  more  generally  and  has
recently been upheld as  an  antidote  to  problems  of  distrust  by  helping  to  prevent  secrecy  in
organisations and by promoting public accountability (Hood and Heald 2006). However, in so  far
as  risk  communication  fulfils  goals  such  as  being  transparent  and  informative   the   primary
objective of transferring risk messages is the reduction of uncertainty. That is to say, according  to
this  conceptualisation  risk  communication  can  be  specified  in  quantitative  terms  as  the  free
conveyance of informational content in risk messages to add or enhance knowledge about risk and
risk-related knowledge. The task for risk communicators is  therefore  to  ensure  that  an  efficient
uninterrupted flow of clear, concise and comprehensible risk information from sender  to  receiver
(as well as any subsequent feedback) is obtained (see also Fischhoff  2005a).  This  perspective  is
reflected  in  commonly  used  definitions  by  academics  and   policy   makers   that   regard   risk
communication in a general sense as:
“The flow of information and risk evaluations back and  forth  between  academic  experts,
regulatory practitioners, interest groups, and the general public” (Leiss 1996, p. 86).
Or as stated by the National Research Council (1989, p. 21):
“an  interactive  exchange  of  information  and  opinion  among  individuals,  groups   and
institutions. It involves multiple messages about the nature of risk and other messages,  not
strictly about risk, that express concerns, opinions or reactions to risk messages or to  legal
and institutional arrangements for risk management”.
The constitution of risk communication according to the risk  message  model  has  its  roots  most
closely   in   the   ‘encoder/decoder’    communication    paradigm    (otherwise    known    as    the
‘sender/receiver’ or ‘transmission’ model after Shannon and Weaver 1949)[2].  Following  Krauss
and Fussell (1996) in the encoder/decoder paradigm ‘meaning’ is said to  reside  as  a  property  of
messages. That is to say, the meanings of messages are fully specified by their elements,  whereby
meaning is encoded in the message and that decoding the message is equivalent  to  specifying  its
meaning. Following the encoder/decoder paradigm in  risk  communication,  risk  information,  or
meaning, is transferred via a process in which an abstract risk  proposition  (i.e.  mental  model  or
belief about risk) is:
a) encoded in a risk message (i.e. transformed into a signal whose elements are seen to have a
one-to-one correspondence with the elements of the proposition) by the sender;
b) transmitted as a signal over a channel to a receiver;
c) decoded by the receiver into an abstract risk proposition which, it is believed, is in
principle isomorphic with the original one;
d) utilised by the receiver as a means by which to reduce uncertainty and guide action.
The receiver may in response to the message act or send their own message and these responses
might then be collected by the original sender as feedback. Senders and receivers are generally
conceived to produce, process and respond to risk messages in accordance with the ‘rational actor
paradigm’ (Jaeger et al. 2001), but the recipients of messages are as such substantively disengaged
from contributing to the generation of the meaning of risk messages. If the message decoded by
the receiver is found not to be identical to that transmitted by the sender this is thought to be
because: the size of the signal relative to ‘noise’ (i.e. signal-to-noise ratio) during message
transmission is not great enough; the message was incorrectly or insufficiently encoded by the
sender; or finally, that the message was incorrectly decoded by the receiver.
To briefly elaborate on these last three points following Krauss and Fussel (1996): First, in the
encoder/decoder paradigm it is assumed that there are often many messages in transmission at any
one time, and that messages are not always transmitted directly between senders and receivers, but
may be relayed by intermediaries, or ‘transmission stations’ to use SARF terminology (see
Kasperson et al. 1988). All communication can therefore conceivably contribute some degree of
‘noise’ to a message which increases the likelihood that a message may become distorted or
perhaps even rendered incomprehensible during transmission (Krauss and Fussell 1996). For
example, individuals make use of multiple sources of risk information in their day-to-day lives, or
information is often mediated by other sources such as the mass media or other individuals they
may come into contact with (Alazewski and Horlick-Jones 2002; Wardman 2006). The noise
generated by the prevalence of other messages, as well as the mediation of risk messages by other
sources can therefore adversely affect the signal-to-noise ratio. This then requires message
recipients to fill in missing information that any noise has omitted or distorted and may lead to the
increased likelihood of misunderstanding. The greater the signal there is relative to noise, then the
closer the transmitted message will be to the original message, and hence the more similar the
received proposition is likely to be to the original one limiting the opportunity for
misunderstanding (Krauss and Fussell 1996). Second, information may be encoded incorrectly or
insufficiently when the sender omits essential details in the linguistic representation of meaning
contained within messages that are necessary to construct the correct mental representation of that
meaning. In such cases receivers may necessarily have to fill in missing detail from pre-existing
knowledge and experience. Finally, even when linguistic representations are received in their
entirety, incorrect decoding may still arise because the mental representations of the receiver may
inevitably differ in some respects to those of the sender, which might not be recognised from the
outset. This variance could be due to different understandings of terms used in linguistic
expressions and representations, or the misapplication of those terms when they are reconstructed
into mental representations by the receiver (Krauss and Fussell 1996).
This communication paradigm serves as a powerful heuristic in risk communication, as Jaeger et
al. (2001) have observed it is the one most utilised in communication studies and employed by
risk managers. Indeed, the encoder/decoder paradigm is central to the SARF (Kasperson et al.
1988), which is arguably one of the most prominent theoretical frameworks informing the risk
communication field at this time. Perhaps to a lesser extent the encoder/decoder paradigm also
figures in the ‘mental models approach’ (Morgan et al.2002), which centres on fashioning and
correcting the provision and design of risk message content in line with the knowledge of the
respective parties concerned[3]. Yet, despite the apparent appeal of the encoder/decoder
paradigm, and by extension the risk message model, a number of criticisms can be made of its
dominant position in the common conceptualisation of risk communication. For example, in
instances where distortion is likely to occur Krauss and Fussell (1996) have observed that
‘redundancy’ (i.e. the multiple and repeated encoding of messages) is the communication strategy
accordingly considered to increase the likelihood that messages will be correctly understood (see
also Krauss and Morsella 2000). However, this shows the risk message model to be somewhat
simplistic in its conception. One notable problem when communicating risk is that encoding and
decoding can both be further hampered by the complexity of the risk concept (Jaeger et al. 2001).
For example, transparency is often advocated as a means by which to reduce uncertainty by
increasing information available to public scrutiny, but according to O’Neill (2002) transparency
in the form of the full disclosure of information might actually result in information overload for
recipients and generate further uncertainty. Furthermore, in many instances there is in fact often
an abundance of information about risk especially in the news media, but people still tend not to
pay any attention (Renn 2006). In which case, it might be argued that simply providing more
information does not in itself necessarily lead to greater understanding because people not only
need the means or capacity by which to be able to judge new information, they must also have the
motivation to do so.
A further concern is that following the conventional wisdom of the risk message model risk
communication has at times unfortunately been construed mechanistically and asymmetrically as
a ‘one-way’ form of communication from sender to receiver. This is typically interpreted as
meaning communication from ‘expert’ officials within organisations to ‘lay’ members of the
public. In one-way communication the lay public are considered to be deficient in their knowledge
about a particular risk issue and that this has to be remedied through disseminating information or
publicising official viewpoints derived from experts (Fischhoff 1995). But unless those
institutions responsible for sorting and assessing information are trusted then there is little reason
to suppose that more information (as through greater transparency) is going to lead to the
acceptance or adoption of a particular risk proposition (see O’Neil 2002). Even when
organisations are required to be transparent it may be in the reasonable interests of outside
observers to withhold their trust, or to deploy ‘critical trust’ in those sources concerned (Walls et
al 2004). Risk communication failure according to the ‘deficit model’ as it has come to be known
is instead conceived as a disruption or breakdown in the transmission of risk messages from
authorities or the miscoding of that information by its recipients. Moreover, whenever there is
public doubt or scepticism about the risk information being transmitted this is typically attributed
to ignorance, scientific illiteracy, or irrationality, which can in turn then be used as justification
for excluding others from making a substantive contribution to risk debates (Sturgis & Allum
2004; Wynne 1989; Wynne 1991). However, as these scholars and others such as Fischhoff
(2005b) and Leiss (1996) forewarn one-way communication can generate the impression that
recipients are being managed, learning no more than an authority wants them to know, and as
such these actions can result in alienating the intended recipients of communications.
Clearly in the face of such concerns the provision of more information through mechanisms such
as redundancy and transparency is plainly not a panacea for the problem of uncertainty in risk
communication. While the risk message model assumes that recipients form judgements solely on
the basis of the message, the fact that people are embedded in complex social networks and
relations which influence expectations, commitments and understandings is generally overlooked
or ignored (Jaeger et al. 2001; Horlick-Jones 2008). One attempt to elaborate on the broader social
dynamics inherent to risk communication is the SARF first proposed by Kasperson et al. (1988)
and later elaborated upon by these and other authors (see Pidgeon et al. 2003 for example). In the
SARF the ‘amplification’ metaphor refers to the intensifying or attenuating of risk signals during
the transmission of information from an information source to transmitters and finally to a
receiver. Each transmitter may alter the original message by adding or deleting incoming signals
and sending a new cluster of signals on to the next transmitter or receiver. The SARF in particular
usefully elaborates on the societal context of risk message exchanges by indicating that risk events
are mediated by the interplay of physical, individual and socio-cultural variables. This broader
emphasis therefore highlights the potential direct and indirect impacts of risk communication on
other actors, groups, and organisations such as the stigmatising of technologies and public health
treatments, or economic losses and wider regulatory impacts.
In certain respects however, the amplification metaphor utilised by the SARF is a limited
representation of the social dynamics that are present during risk communication (see Rayner
1988). According to the SARF approach risk messages may be imbued with signal value which is
amplified by transmission stations at various stages, but it retains the central premise of the
encoder/decoder paradigm that meaning resides as a property of the risk message that is being
transmitted. A communicative exchange is therefore still conceived to amount to little more than
the combined outputs of autonomous information processors. So although the proponents of the
SARF try to emphasise the wider social interactions and impacts arising from risk events, and also
notably declare an interest in moving critical attention away from one-way communication to the
potential for two-way communication, relatively little consideration is generally given towards
elaborating in any great detail upon the social dynamics and influences that may also feature in
the co-construction of risk meaning (see also Murdock et al. 2003).
These general shortcomings to the risk message model are arguably  because  the  complex  social
processes that may be of interest often do not form part of  the  message,  but  are  inherent  to  the
‘noise’ that is conceived as the lesser part of communication to  be  avoided  or  filtered  out.  Risk
communication researchers and practitioners therefore usually try to uncover or amplify the  ‘true’
risk signals contained within messages and  to  facilitate  direct  correspondence  of  risk  meaning
between  communicating  parties.  Contrary  to  this  view   however,   fields   such   as   discourse
psychology and anthropology have highlighted that by focussing upon noise and variability in  the
context of their occurrence one might in fact find  a  different  kind  of  order  and  coherence  that
reveals  specific  rhetorical  uses  and  functionalities  of   communication   tailored   to   particular
contingencies and instances of interaction (Edwards 2005). For instance, Boholm (2008) contends
that the pragmatics of risk communication demand that in addition to content  and  the  manner  of
presenting that content, complex social processes of meaning creation  and  interpretation  situated
in real life also need to be taken into  account.  As  of  yet,  and  despite  its  relative  advances  the
SARF approach  has  not  explicitly  incorporated  a  consideration  of  pragmatics,  or  indeed  the
importance  of   ‘noise’  more  generally,  into  its  development   and   conceptualisation   of   risk
communication.  The three remaining risk communication models that are subsequently presented
expand upon different ways in which the social basis for risk communication may  be  understood,
and therefore provide a useful counterpoint to the basic tenets of risk message model.
5. The ‘risk dialogue’ model
The second concern of the normative imperative for risk communication highlighted above  is  for
the participation of citizens and other stakeholders  in  risk  related  debate  and  decision  making.
Recent risk communication research has, for example, indicated and  largely  supported  a  general
trend towards facilitating stakeholder involvement  in  deliberative  dialogue  to  help  characterise
risk and set risk management priorities and policies which  represent  a  cross-section  of  interests
(see Stern and Fineberg 1996; Lofstedt 2005). In line with this view, the ‘risk dialogue’  model  as
it is termed here considers risk communication as an historically  situated  discursive  engagement
between all those who become  involved  in  a  particular  risk  issue.  In  risk  dialogue  actors  are
regarded equally and treated like partners allowing them greater responsibility to shape  how  risks
are managed and share what is  learned  about  them  to  make  a  substantive  contribution  to  risk
debates  (see  Fischhoff  2005b).  As  with  concepts   of   deliberative   democracy   no   particular
viewpoint is excluded a priori and the interests of everyone are considered.
In contrast to the risk message model a distinctive feature of the  risk  dialogue  model  lies  in  the
notion of two-way risk communication as a collaborative interaction. Participants in risk  dialogue
not only have to be responsive to how others engage with them in communication, they also  need
to  be  responsive  to  other  stakeholders  whom  might  have   different   information   needs   and
perspectives or insights to offer. A communicative exchange  is  conceived  not  as  the  combined
outputs of two or more autonomous information processors, but as a fluid joint accomplishment of
participants whom have collaborated to achieve  substantive  understanding  together  (see  Krauss
and Fussell 1996). That is to say, risk dialogue does not  consist  of  a  set  of  discursively  related
independent episodes through which speakers act with respect to  one  another  individualistically,
but is an intrinsically social  and  cooperative  activity  whereby  meaning  creation  is  situated  in
particular  discursive  context.  Whereas  in  the  risk  message  model  it  is  assumed  that  people
communicate to convey information which may be used by others to enhance  their  understanding
about risk for example, in the risk dialogue model although information  exchange  is  part  of  the
communication process, risk understanding is achieved through  inter-subjectivity.  In  this  sense,
mutual  understanding  is  not  something  that  is  thought  can  be  achieved  purely  through   the
exchange of knowledge about the world, but is fashioned anew out of the divergent social realities
which participants bring together (Jovchelovitch 2007). According to  Krauss  and  Fussell  (1996)
such inter-subjectivity is also continually modified by acts of communication,  and  what  is  made
known  by  what  is  said  is  affected  by  what  is  tacitly  taken  for  granted.  But  because  inter-
subjectivity is assumed to be neither implicit in the knowledge participants bring to  the  situation,
nor explicitly coded in language, for risk communication to be successful participants are  obliged
to take some pains to ensure that they have a shared conception of the meaning  of  each  utterance
before proceeding to the next (see Krauss and Fussell 1996).
According to this model an inter-subjective understanding of risk and thus risk  communication  is
discernable  in  a  Habermasian  sense  like  other  communication  as  a  fundamental   democratic
process which can provide  a  solution  to  social  risk  conflicts  by  allowing  consensus  between
responsible citizens to prevail through communicative  rationality  and  reasoning  (see  Habermas
1984; 1987). This does, however, require that a number of ideal  speech  conditions  and  ‘rational
discourse ethics’ are met for successful communication to take place. For example, if  participants
are deemed to be acting  intelligibly,  truthfully,  trustworthily  and  legitimately  then  dialogue  is
assumed to function well (Burkart 2007). But if these ideals are violated,  as  they  often  are,  then
participants become involved in discourse where they have the opportunity to  express  doubt  and
interrogate the truth of assertions, the trustworthiness of expressions, or the legitimacy of different
interests; only when plausible answers are given will  the  flow  of  communication  continue  (see
Burkart  2007).  Whether  with  regard  to  moral  statements  or   statements   of   fact,   a   central
component  to  the  risk  dialogue  model  is  that  the  resolution  of  risk  conflict  rests  upon  the
possibility for agreement on the most convincing argument or risk-related proposition. To draw on
Habermas this is because through deliberative dialogue arguments can be weighed and  compared,
problems are dissected, better solutions  may  be  negotiated  and  substantive  understanding  thus
replaces instrumental success as a goal of communication (Pellizzoni 2001). However, as  Burkart
(2007) observes, substantive understanding is not normally taken as an end in  itself,  but  pursued
with the intent of putting interests into reality and allows for the co-ordination of  actions  and  the
synchronising of goals on the basis of common definitions of a situation and  consensus.  Drawing
on the ‘post-normal science’ framework devised by Functowitz and  Ravetz  (1992),  Rosa  (1998)
has noted for example that the modern world  has  generated  a  set  of  risk  problems  demanding
scientific understanding, but which are quite often too complex or ambiguous to  yield  to  science
alone and so must be opened to wider scrutiny and debate by extended peer communities (see also
Klinke and Renn 2002). For Rosa (1998), the key question to be addressed is ‘how  we  [can]  best
use our various systems  of  knowledge  to  improve  our  democratic  decision  making  over  risk
choices?’ (p40).
The conventional wisdom here is  seemingly  that  the  higher  the  decision  stakes  and  the  more
uncertainty and social ambiguity that are associated with a risk problem, then the greater the  need
for risk dialogue. This deliberative ideal therefore offers not just a theoretical perspective  of  how
risk communication  might  take  place,  but  reflects  a  normative  imperative  for  what  could  in
principle be achieved by consenting parties. Yet, contrary to  popular  opinion  and  despite  recent
trends, engaging people in dialogue about risk though often important and essential to  the  policy-
making process is not problem free and so should not be regarded  as  the  ‘be-all  and  end-all’  of
risk communication (Lofstedt 2005; Fischhoff 1995). Critics such as Coglianese (1997) and  Rossi
(1997) have argued that  approaches  which  emphasise  participation,  dialogue,  deliberation  and
consensus have in practice generally failed to live up to expectations. One notable problem is  that
the procedures required to match deliberative ideals can be  extremely  difficult  to  implement  by
being both costly and overly  demanding  on  participants.  It  has  also  been  demonstrated  to  be
difficult to secure a broadly representative selection of participants and ensure that  certain  parties
do  not  exert  undue  influence  over   proceedings   and   substantive   outcomes.   Campbell   and
Townsend  (2003)  have  argued  for   example   that   popular   opinions   about   the   commercial
application of biotechnology in the UK are more ambivalent than was recently represented  in  the
findings of the GMNation? debate  (an  unprecedented  public  consultation  exercise)  one  reason
being that people who were less concerned were it seems less likely to take part in  such  a  debate
(but see Pidgeon et al. 2004).
Risk dialogue can therefore sometimes become narrowly skewed by the sectional interests of self-
selecting individuals or groups  with  their  own  particular  biases  or  political  agendas,  but  this
criticism could at least in principle be addressed procedurally. The risk dialogue model is however
beset  by  two  further  issues.  First,  as  Pellizzoni  (2001)   contends,   sometimes   conflicts   are
intrinsically deep-lying, principles and factual descriptions profoundly different and uncertainty so
radical that no universal reason or best argument may be found. Faced with  such  difficulties  risk
controversies can remain intractable no matter what procedures are put in  place.  Second,  authors
such as Flyvbjerg and Richardson (2002) have argued that reliance  on  procedural  approaches  to
communication  theory  in  the  Habermasian  mould  may  in  fact  hamper  understanding  of  the
processes of democratic social change by neglecting how power shapes discourse in areas such  as
environmental planning. In short these critics  highlight  that  a  focus  on  Habermasian  ideals  of
‘what should be done’ has unduly limited  the  appreciation  of  real  world  practices  in  terms  of
‘what is actually done’ and  the  instrumental  dynamics  which  shape  them.  These  instrumental
dynamics and the means by which they  act  through  and  upon  risk  communication  provide  the
focus of the remaining two risk communication models.
6. The ‘risk field’ model
The  instrumental  imperative  outlined  above   emphasises   that   risk   communication   may   be
understood in light of the strategic conduct of competing social actors  and  how  they  distinguish
themselves, their intentions and their beliefs amongst those of other actors wishing to further  their
own particular interests. The orientation of risk communication in these  respects  can  be  seen  in
definitions which for example refer to risk communication as:
 “any purposeful exchange of information  about  health  or  environmental  risks  between
interested parties” (Covello et al. 1986).
‘Purpose’ in the above sense is typically seen to  be  required  to  distinguish  the  sending  of  risk
information from noise present  during  communication  and  implies  an  intention  to  expose  the
target audience to a system of meaningful signals which may in turn  change  people’s  perception
of the issue or their image of particular actors (Jaeger et al. 2001). The authors of the  SARF  have
suggested for  example  that  symbols  attached  to  message  sponsors  such  as  ‘big  business’  or
‘NGO’  may  be  included  in  the  transmission  of  risk  messages  and  can   carry   strong   value
implications that can both trigger the attention  of  potential  receivers  as  well  as  influence  how
messages  are  evaluated  (see  Kasperson  et  al.   1988).   That   other   actors   involved   in   risk
communication  are  considered  during  communication  is  an  important  point,  but   the   SARF
arguably under specifies how context also provides additional cues for parties to generate  interest,
draw inferences and interpret other actors’ intentions over and above the content  of  messages.  A
further concern is that the SARF generally assumes that the actors involved in risk communication
are interacting on a ‘level playing field’, whereas in fact the resources at each actor’s  disposal  are
more often distributed unequally or valued quite differently (Murdock et  al.  2003).  In  short,  the
SARF generally fails to make an adequate account  of  the  importance  of  context  and  power  in
determining  the  availability  of  opportunities  of  different  actors  to  influence  substantive  risk
outcomes.
By contrast, the ‘risk field’ model as it is termed here is conceived following the work of
Bourdieu (1977; 1986) and considers risk communication as occurring within a ‘field of activity’
wherein the position and social influence of each actor is seen in relation to one another and
reflects the various types and amounts of ‘capital’ (e.g. money, knowledge, connections, prestige)
at their disposal (see Murdock et al. 2003; Schedler et al. 1998). The field of activity may relate to
such varied concerns as the siting of a nuclear waste repository, the introduction of a new
technology or the vaccination of a population against infectious disease for example. Following
Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of ‘habitus’, although the strategic conduct of actors within a field is
not fixed, their dispositions are historically situated, acquired through socialisation and embedded
in accumulated everyday practice and understandings of the ‘rules of the game’. An actor’s
practical sense of how risk communication operates through complex interacting systems of
beliefs is thus likely to play a role in influencing the strategy they adopt and ultimately its
effectiveness. The field of activity is also considered to be interactive and recursively negotiated
in nature. For instance the distribution of capital is an expression of power relationships, which in
turn are expressed in rhetorical strategies, which in turn may reshape power relationships. Hence
risk communication competence can be viewed as a rhetorical resource, or a form of capital (see
Murdock et al. 2003), that is affected by the distribution of other capital, but which can in return
also be instrumentally deployed to affect the distribution of that capital. That is, the actions that
are generated by the dispositions of different actors are constitutive of the objective conditions
and social positioning of actors within a field of activity (Schinkel 2007).
Legitimacy and trust are primary considerations of  the  risk  field  model  because  these  qualities
help to define  the  boundaries  for  decisions  and  actions  that  are  perceived  as  acceptable  and
permitted within a given time and  context,  and  when  questioned  can  increase  uncertainty  and
impact on an organisation’s resources (Chess 2001; Holmstrom  2005).  A  growing  body  of  risk
communication literature has indicated that without legitimacy and trust the  potential  efficacy  of
risk communication activities can be markedly undermined (see  Lofstedt  2005;  Cvetkovich  and
Lofstedt 1999; Slovic 1993). Yet  at  the  same  time  risk  communication  has  been  increasingly
advocated as  fulfilling  a  vital  role  in  helping  administering  authorities  to  reduce  social  risk
conflicts by securing legitimacy and enhancing trust in risk management and  regulation  (Pidgeon
and Hayden-Rogers 2007). The  power  of  risk  communication  as  represented  in  the  risk  field
model signifies the strategic play of actors within the possible field of activity, and  its  expression
can take many forms such as moral advice, ideological manipulation or rational argumentation. To
the extent that the risk communicator’s intentions are understood and accepted as  legitimate  in  a
particular context risk communication may therefore  be  considered  to  be  successful.  However,
as  Krauss  and  Fussell  (1996)  observe  following   Grice   (1957;   1969)   and   Austin   (1962),
communication can be considered successful only  in  this  sense  if  the  interlocutor  or  ‘speaker’
intended  the  communicative  exchange  to  create  an  effect  such  as  a  particular  belief  in   the
addressee, and the interlocutor intended that effect to result  from  the  addressee’s  recognition  of
that intention. The inherent difficulty which follows is that in order to have a  desired  impact  risk
communication must be enacted in such a way as to try to take account of how  entire  systems  of
beliefs will respond, though the risk communicator  does  not  know  the  full  content  of  what  is
constituted by what they do, or if what they target will be responsive to fundamental change. 
Whilst  from  an  instrumental  perspective  it  may  be  recognised  that  another  actor’s  concerns
sometimes have to be addressed in order to meet particular ends, unlike in  risk  dialogue  there  is
much less inclination amongst actors to discuss what those ends should be, or to come to a mutual
understanding about them, without a forceful incentive. The accomplishment of shared acceptance
of a particular risk proposition may as such be primarily attempted by  processes  of  coercion  and
social influence rather than through being fashioned out of mutual cooperation or consensual inter-
subjectivity. The robustness of fundamental  beliefs  and  the  recourse  of  actors  to  instrumental
rationalities during communication do however both present a  serious  challenge  to  instrumental
communication. In broader theoretical terms this challenge may be understood  as  a  consequence
of the evolution of present day communication systems or subcultures and their internal  dynamics
along particular paths. For instance, in Luhmann’s (1995) ‘systems theory’ it is  hypothesised  that
the increasing complexity of society in modernity has led to functional differentiation,  that  is  the
clustering of specialised rationales in functional communication systems which each constitutes  a
particular social reality and whose complexity isolates  the  system  against  other  communicative
realities. These systems are continuously recursively reproduced  and  changed,  but  usually  only
through iterative self-referential communicative processes that select meaning related  to  previous
beliefs and rules. Successfully shifting one belief in an  individuated,  or  subcultural  system  will
not necessarily bring about a desired outcome because other core elements of the system  may  act
to dampen the fundamental impact of any movement  or  change  (see  also  Breakwell  2001  with
reference to Moscovici’s ‘social representations theory’).
This has in turn led to the concern expressed by Boholm (2008) that the possibility for co-
ordinated selection taking place between different actors in risk disputes is particularly low. Risk
is a relational, comparative and temporal concept that is commonly subject to different
interpretations from diverse standpoints; however, as Boholm further contends the diversity of
these standpoints is often differentiated by the agency and sovereignty of those parties involved.
For instance, one actor may make decisions according to a particular risk rationale with another
being exposed to the consequences of those decisions. Otherwise stated many risk conflicts may
not rest so much on debating risk estimates, but the fairness and equity of the technical options
presented (Rayner and Cantor 1987). In contexts where the risk dialogue model prevails such
power is diffused by actors allowing all parties equal agency in determining risk characterisation
and options for its social distribution or mitigation. But in many circumstances different positions
may be so entrenched that each actor is reluctant to empower the other party with the sovereignty
to make decisions over the issues of most concern to them in such a way which might contradict
their own subjective understanding and rationale for action. If, or when, different actors reach an
impasse over a particular risk proposition, activity or intention, this places even further emphasis
on achieving greater legitimacy for one’s own perspective in the broad interplay of intentions
mobilised by different actors in social risk discourses so that agency might be attained or
preserved. Without high levels of confidence and trust, the relinquishing of agency from one actor
to another may as such represent a core barrier to the possibility for inter-subjectivity.
Consequently, the social representations of risk that emerge are generally purposeful and shaped
by the social polemic that takes place between different actors with the intention of furthering self-
serving interests (Breakwell 2001). In this way the context of risk communication as represented
by the risk field model thus delimits the possibility for a unified conception of risk, its
characterisation and consequences, or what might be done whilst at the same time seemingly
increasing the perceived need for risk communication to take place. For instance the risk field
model suggests that the requirement for overt risk communication efforts by each actor will likely
increase by virtue of the pragmatic value of risk communication in response to the social and
political pressures faced when dealing with risk and how they bear upon the agency of each actor
concerned. Rothstein et al. (2006) have indicated for example that the implementation of formal
risk communication initiatives may be understood in practical terms as a systemic consequence of
private and public organisations needing to address the potential ‘institutional risks’ that
inherently arise from attending to ‘societal risk’ management. An issue often at stake here is that
when organisations are officially charged with the responsibility for managing societal risks (i.e.
risks to the environment or public health for example) problems inevitably arise which put a
spotlight on the limits of institutional arrangements for addressing those problems and can
threaten the legitimate functioning of the organisation concerned. Instrumental mechanisms are
therefore needed to preserve the integrity and procedural legitimacy of official decisions and
regulatory outcomes. Risk communication decisions may thus become shaped by instrumental
rationalities to preserve the agency of the organisation in question as much as by any normative
concerns or incidences of risk that would have otherwise guided official actions (Power 2004).
In seeing risk communication as fundamentally shaped by powerful discourses, each with its  own
substantive content as well as  internal  and  external  power/knowledge  dynamics,  we  may  also
consider how  social,  economic  or  political  forces  help  to  shape  and  define  a  particular  risk
problem  and  bias  risk  communication  towards  certain  practices   and   substantive   outcomes.
However,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  the  instrumental  use  of  risk  communication  is
intrinsically ‘bad’. The success of many  public  health  risk  initiatives  for  instance  may  depend
upon an organisation’s ability to marshal risk communication resources to promote an agenda that
does not necessarily work against the interests of those immediately affected even  though  it  may
not be totally appreciated or accepted at the time. Although risk communication may be utilised as
a  way  of   publicly   rationalising   particular   viewpoints   and   decisions,   the   power   of   risk
communication in  this  sense  may  also  work  through  appeals  to  instrumental  and  calculative
rationalities of individuals in ways that do not limit the options available to them in obvious ways,
but which  enhance  their  capacity  for  self-control.  That  these  discursive  forces  are  not  often
consciously or reflexively accessible to practical risk reasoning  on  a  day-to-day  basis,  but  may
nevertheless steer the way people think and feel about risk is  considered  more  fully  in  the  final
risk communication model presented in this article.
7. The ‘risk government’ model
Reconceptualising risk communication as a political enterprise allows for the possibility that
rather than being based on communicative rationality, risk propositions may be appropriated as
‘truth’ through the exercise of power. In this sense the risk field model conceives of power as
something held and wielded by one group over another, but whilst the risk field model
predominantly focuses on how each actor attempts to utilise risk communication to achieve,
maintain or resist sovereignty within a field of activity, the foremost concern of the ‘risk
government’ model as it is termed here is in interrogating how the rules that govern the field of
possible activity are structured and bear upon the dispositions and behaviour of those concerned.
The orientation of the risk government model is made with particular reference to the concept of
‘governmentality’ which was first introduced by Foucault (1991) as a way to draw attention to a
certain way of thinking and acting embodied in attempts to know and govern the wealth, health
and happiness of populations (Dean 1999; Rose 1999; Rose and Miller 1992). In contrast to the
risk field model this perspective emphasises unintended consequences and the diffuse nature of
power effects that shape actors and their own sense of self and self interest. As a starting point
Foucault departs from conventional state-based models of political rule and asserts that the
government of a population is contemporarily achieved not via the delegated exercise of sovereign
power, but ‘through the wide dispersal of technologies of power which are relatively invisible and
which function in discursive sites and practices throughout the social fabric’ (Smith 2000 p283 ).
For Foucault power relations do not always result in a removal of liberty or options available to
individuals, but may empower citizens so that they may actively engage in free choices and
decision-making (Rose 1999). In these regards the notion of governmentality suggests how forms
of political rule and exploitation are linked to the individual’s capacity for self-control and
considers how freedom, rather than being the opposite of government is one of its key inventions
and most significant resources (see Rose 1999).
In contrast to conventional approaches to risk communication, from a governmentality perspective
the prevalence of attention to ‘risk’ is, following Rose (1999), not seen so much as a consequence
of changes in the contemporary existential condition of humans and their world, but as a particular
style of thinking which is employed to render the future knowable and calculable. Risk as
articulated through governmentality is therefore similar in conception to an aspect of risk
associated with Beck’s (1992) ‘risk society’ thesis. According to Giddens (1999) the idea of a
‘risk society’ does not necessarily imply an increase of risk within society, but rather that society
is increasingly preoccupied with the future and safety, which generates the notion of risk and the
subsequent organisation of society with regard to this notion. According to Rose (1999) risk
thinking forms an individualising logic which facilitates the disciplining of populations by
requiring citizens to take upon themselves the responsibility for the security of their persons and
their property. For example, for Rose (1999) the multiplication of perceptions of risk through
media reporting works to incite a continuous self-scrutiny and monitoring of diet and lifestyle in
terms of the avoidance of threats to health but with especial regard to the individual’s capacity for
self-control. By mobilising perceptions of risk the dispositions and behaviour of individual
citizens may, at least in principle, be regulated at distance and the responsibility for maintaining
the health of a population is thus transferred from direct state control to the individual.
In risk communication terms the operation of these concerns may be seen in part to parallel
Sunstein and Thaler’s (2003) notion of ‘libertarian paternalism’, by which it is thought desirable
for private and public institutions to influence the behaviour of others if this encourages and
respects their freedom of choice. For example, Sunstein and Thaler (2003) have argued that it is
not only necessary, but in practice also inevitable that authorities attempt to steer people’s choices
in welfare promoting directions that would otherwise be restricted by the bounded rationalities
and bounded self-control of individual actors. In line with such concerns, Fischoff (2005a) has
similarly suggested that as individuals do not follow ‘decision theory’, so psychological work may
find an applied focus by identifying and explaining disparities between normative ideals and the
descriptive reality and then aid in the design of prescriptive interventions to help people make
‘better’ (i.e. more normative) choices. Risk communication interventions may encourage better
choices by acting upon people through education or upon their environment through better
disclosures as an alternative to curtailing freedom of choice through dissuading people from
certain actions or banning particular products (Fischhoff 2005a).
In a Foucaultian sense, libertarian paternalism and the work of psychology as appropriated
through risk communication may be seen to represent attempts by authorities to problematise the
dispositions and behaviours of citizens in terms of the way in which they ought to maximise their
health, wealth and happiness. For example, nutrient labels on food products are designed to
‘empower’ consumers and consumer choice. Whereas this form of risk communication might be
conceived in the risk message model as a conventional top-down strategy to increase information
and reduce uncertainty for consumers when choosing a particular food product, a governmentality
perspective would indicate how its effects exceed such imperatives and are in fact part of more
widespread and diffuse governmental ‘programmes of the self’. Otherwise stated, and to
paraphrase Rose (1999), the power of risk communication is conceived in these terms not so much
a matter of imposing constraints upon citizens as a way of ‘making up’ citizens capable of bearing
a kind of regulated freedom and responsibility determined and acted upon through risk thinking.
The process of ‘making up’ or ‘responsibilising’ citizens in the risk government model of risk
communication is conceived to operate following Rose and Miller’s (1992) articulation of
governmentality as an expression of ‘political rationalities’ and ‘governmental technologies’.
Political rationalities primarily concern the changing discursive and cultural fields within which
the exercise of power is conceptualised and the particular ways in which the exercising of power
by diverse authorities is morally justified. Governmental technologies concern ‘the complex of
mundane programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through
which authorities seek to embody and give effect to [political rationalities and] governmental
ambitions’ (p175). In this light risk communication must be defined both in terms of how and why
‘risk’ comes to be employed in particular political rationalities and embodied in the governmental
technologies (e.g. communication practices such as food labelling) which give effect to those
political risk rationalities.
By linking political risk rationalities to governmental technologies it is possible to formulate a
conception of risk communication that ‘connects the lives of individuals, groups and organisations
to the aspirations of authorities in advanced liberal [societies]’ (Rose and Miller p176). The
orientation of analysis in these respects draws attention to the productive processes and
organisational constellations through which risk communication, as with other instruments or
‘technologies of government’, generates new risk objects, new forms of risk knowledge,
subjective identities, dispositions and conduct. By taking a Foucauldian perspective the focus of
concern in the risk government model thus extends beyond linguistically reflected power
exchanges between persons and groups to the discursive and cultural structures within which they
are deployed, that is to that which influences the conduct of risk communication conduct. This
analytical approach might therefore concern questions such as ‘how, given the infinite potential
for meaning production in social discourse, do notions of risk come to delimit what it is possible
to think and say at a particular time, what purpose does this serve, and to who’s benefit?’. For
example, past critics have been all too aware that the privileging of risk knowledge and expertise
was and often still is seen as essential to the success of risk communication (see for example
Wynne 1992). Technical skills such as forecasting, surveying and statistical modelling may in
many cases act as influential imagery with which to help persuade audiences of the integrity of
risk propositions whilst at the same time limiting the scope of non-experts to define what counts
as truth or knowledge.
The privileging of risk related knowledge and expertise can also be seen to work in other ways.
For instance, ever more sophisticated testing methods and investigations employed in the social
science of risk perception have made available a growing body of knowledge on the structure and
function of people’s responses to risk. Risk perception research has as such been utilised by
decision makers as a tool to support prediction, prevention and remediation through risk
communication interventions and programmes in a diverse array of areas. However, it is already
evident that the application and evaluation of risk perception research findings has had far-
reaching effects and implications which perhaps go beyond the original goals of risk perception
researchers themselves. Whereas previous scholarly work has revealed that people’s dispositions
and behaviours in relation to risk are often highly gendered, social, emotive and symbolic, and
that theory and methods appropriate to such qualities need to be invoked to produce a valid social
science of people’s responses to risk (see Joffe 2003), it seems that the prescriptive lessons often
drawn from descriptive explanations of individuals’ ‘gender’ and ‘emotional’, ‘cultural’ and
‘political’ dispositions are sometimes used to marginalise particular contributions to risk debate
and decision making (see Wardman 2006). That is to say, the construction of subjective
dispositions attributed to individuals along such dualistic notions as ‘rational/irrational’ and
‘objective/subjective’ embodied in notions of  ‘gender’, ‘emotion’, ‘culture’ and ‘politics’ bear
direct relation to validity claims concerning the correspondence between risk perception, risk
assessment and ‘real’ risk and thus their place within the boundaries of legitimate risk debate and
decision making. By contrast scientists tend to be considered ‘rational’ and ‘objective’ and these
attributes render their contributions as having more value in terms of competition for legitimacy
and attention on risk related issues (Garvin 2001).
Furthermore, risk perception knowledge also plays an important role in signifying the need for
risk communication interventions to facilitate the correction and adjustment of people’s
dispositions and behaviours. As such the real socio-political impact of risk perception research
may be observed not so much in the advancement of risk perception knowledge, but rather the
promotion of a form of behavioural determinism in which ‘risk perception’ serves as a heuristic
for all kinds of social and individual divergence from normative ideals[4]. The social power of
risk perception knowledge as appropriated by risk communicators may therefore appear to lie less
in explaining that which influences the disposition and behaviour of people when at risk, and more
in the discursive construction of risk arising from the dispositions and behaviour of populations.
That is to say, risk perception would thus be considered here not so much an empirical matter of
fact, but rather as an invention, or social representation, whose reality rests as the result of a
particular form of problematisation concerning the government of people within a population.
Seen in this light ‘risk perception’ discourse serves as a regime of truth that constructs individuals
as particular kinds of subjects (Lemke 2004). A Foucauldian approach however steers the
prospective analyst away from such sterile dualisms as ‘rational/irrational’ and
‘objective/subjective’ implicit to the respective correspondence of different forms of representing
risk (such as science or lay experience) and the actual risk reality towards an interrogation of how
qualities of knowledge and truth are bestowed upon risk propositions and statements as embodied
in risk communication practices (see also Demeritt 2001; Richardson 1996). For example, as
articulated through the lens of governmentality the case may be stated that the assessment,
predictive testing and appraisal of risk perception can in the above sense be conceived as part of
broader socio-political priorities for the management and government of populations observed in a
multiplicity of areas of the risk society. The subjective qualities that demarcate risk perception
may in themselves thus be regarded as representing a risk to governmental programmes and
projects to enhance the health, wealth and happiness of populations which need to be addressed.
Fischhoff (1990) has made the telling observation that psychologists, as experts in risk perception,
often seem most needed by policymakers when a particular aspect of the public’s behaviour
threatens their policies. Fischhoff (1990) therefore forewarns that in such cases social scientists,
and by extension social science, can quite feasibly be put to work against the public interest on
occasions when:
- Political aspersions which cast the public as troublesome are simply and uncritically
accepted by academics, thus undermining the public’s political credibility.
- Social scientific remedies prescribed to deal with such behaviour shift the political balance
against the public interest.
- Claiming to know how to explain their behaviour reduces the perceived need to let publics
speak for themselves.
- Assisting policymakers leads to the fortification of their power, by helping them fine-tune
programmes, anticipate and overcome resistance, or guide and legitimise initiatives.
- Claiming to know what particular publics might want and need without seeking their
clarification is used to justify current actions.
- Research findings are misappropriated by policy makers to justify decisions which
actually disadvantage and disenfranchise the people concerned
With this in mind it is interesting to consider that, as indicated earlier, a growing body of literature
has generally focussed on the importance of public trust in the success of risk communication.
Yet, by contrast, the risk government model by highlighting governmental forms of power,
techniques of surveillance and the regulation of populations instead rather emphasises the
question of ‘institutionalised mistrust’ of the public in the way that populations are constructed in
‘at-risk discourses’, that is ‘at risk of jeopardising through present dispositions and behaviours,
desired future [outcomes]’ (Kelly 2001 p30; see also Kelly 2003). The ways in which such
rationales are embodied in risk communication practices does however deserve much more
research attention, but these points serve to illustrate some of the novel ways in which taking a
governmentality perspective may contribute to longstanding debates within the risk
communication field and highlights possible areas for future academic inquiry.
8. Conclusions
This article seeks to bring to the fore some of the underlying rationales that inform common
conceptions of the constitution of risk communication in academic and policy communities. Three
imperatives typically employed in the utilisation of risk communication are outlined and a
theoretical scheme is subsequently devised to help articulate four fundamental ‘idealised’ models
of risk communication in light of these considerations. It is contended that the diverse conceptual
foundations underlying the orientation of each model suggest a further need for a more
contextualised view of risk communication that takes account not only of the strengths and
limitations of different formulations of risk communication, but also the underlying
knowledge/power dynamics that underlie its constitution. In keeping with calls for more
integrated approaches to the study of risk within the social sciences (Horlick-Jones and Sime
2004; Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 2006) this article may be seen as not only taking advantage of a
cross-fertilisation of ideas from a variety of different disciplines, but also for having highlighted
an opportunity for the development of future risk communication research along the many themes
identified above. In particular it is hoped that the integrative theoretical understanding presented
here will help to bring some much needed clarity to academic and policy discourses about the use
and utility risk communication in advanced liberal societies. It is also hoped that it will help to
broaden the concept of communication and the scope of empirical inquiry that has presently come
to predominantly occupy the risk communication field.
However, it is cautioned that this article is not an attempt to explain the full range of risk related
communicative behaviour, nor could it feasibly do so. Rather four approaches to risk
communication are distinguished, namely the risk message model, the risk dialogue model, the
risk field model and the risk government model. These models should not be considered as
providing a definitive account of risk communication, nor should it be considered that any of
these models is wholly inaccurate or mistaken. It is also unfortunately beyond the scope of this
article to outline the methodological considerations that would accompany each model. Instead
the aim is to articulate the particular projection that each way of thinking about risk
communication conveys and that their differences should be taken seriously in academic and
policy discourse because different conceptions of risk communication bear heavily on its practice.
A more fine grained view of risk communication should in the very least generate discussion
about which model is most applicable in different contexts and why, on what occasions they may
overlap, or in choosing or adhering to a particular model what other considerations might
otherwise become hidden or masked from view in risk communication research and practice.
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------------------------------------
[1] The notion of normative, instrumental and substantive imperatives was first characterised by
Fiorino (1990) to account for different arguments for engaging in dialogue on risk. Authors
previously citing these three arguments have tended to place emphasis on the normative - as
distinct from a normative - rationale for dialogue at each stage in risk management and appraisal
following the earlier concerns of Fiorino’s (1990) work (see also Stern and Fineberg 1996 for
example). The conceptualisation and development of these imperatives notably tends to vary
slightly between authors however, readers may therefore wish to consult the citations listed above
for alternative interpretations.
[2] The encoder/decoder communication paradigm as it is conceived and articulated here follows
a social psychological approach offered by Kraus and Fussel (1996). This approach differs
somewhat in interpretation to that provided by authors such as Schedler et al. (1998) following the
work of Hall (1980), which takes a more contextualised view of the encoding/decoding process.
Instead, this view of encoding/decoding is perhaps more similarly in conception to the simpler
‘transmission model’ outlined by Schedler et al. (1998).
[3] The mental models approach (Morgan et al. 2002) is primarily a methodological approach to
risk communication design rather than a way of conceptualising risk communication per se
though the authors of this approach have in part elaborated upon its conceptual foundations. The
mental models approach is understood to be generally rooted in the psychology of risk perception
and so is primarily individualistic in focus. However, the approach recognises that understanding,
knowledge and experience between communication participants is not necessarily isomorphic and
needs to be appreciated in communication design. More recently researchers such as Breakwell
(2001) and Schlag (2007) have also begun to extend the social dimensions of the mental models
approach in light of Moscovici’s Social Representations Theory, and in so doing have highlighted
how the approach may take into account such factors as the differences in knowledge and belief
systems between people from different subcultures.
[4] This idea is particularly informed by a reading of Lemke’s (2004) argument on the social
power of genetic information which places emphasis on analysing ‘technologies of power’ rather
than the ‘power of technologies’ and their role in defining the particular subjectivities of
individuals.
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